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THE PHILOSOPHY OF COLONIZATION
UNDERLYING TAXATION IMPOSED UPON TRIBAL
NATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Angelique A. EagleWoman*
(Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin)**
This article will review the philosophical foundations of colonialism in regard to
the imposition of United States taxing authority within Indian Country. First, the legal
status of Tribal Nations as sovereigns within mid-North America will be set out in
conjunction with the sovereign authority to impose taxation. Second, the history of
taxation within Indian Country by the United States federal government and the
individual states composing the United States will be examined. Third, an examination
of the philosophical considerations underlying imposition of federal and state taxes in
Indian Country will be presented. The final section will focus on the problems inherent
in the current structure and the consequences of those problems for the financial well-
being of Tribal Nations.
I. THE STATUS OF TRIBAL NATIONS AS SOVEREIGN AND THE MAINTENANCE OF
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
Tribal Nations are inherently sovereign by internal definition as well as by classic
European political science theory. Sovereignty is defined by Euro-American theory as
"the international independence of a state, combined with the right of power of
regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation.''1 Tribal Nations have
historically been self-sufficient entities which negotiated agreements with foreign powers
and continue to govern themselves internally. 2 The political structures of Tribal Nations
* Assistant Professor of Law at Hamline University School of Law; Stanford University, B.A., Political
Science; University of North Dakota Law, J.D. with Distinction; University of Tulsa College of Law L.L.M. in
American Indian and Indigenous Law with Honors. This article is dedicated to my many grandmothers who
taught me that persistence, prayer, and laughter will bring positive change-to Ramona (DeCoteau)
Washington, to Ann (Rodriguez) Grabauskas, to Helen (Badger) Shepherd, to Lydia (Thompson) Renville,
Rebecca (DeMarrias) Williams, and to Maxine (Nozhackum) Ramirez.
** Author's Dakota name translates to "Good Eagle Woman Who Takes Care of the People."
1. Black's Law Dictionary 971 (6th ed., West 1991).
2. Wendell H. Oswalk, This Land Was Theirs 36 (7th ed., McGraw-Hill Mayfield 2002) ("Until the early
1800s, treaty negotiations were between governments, which established the basis for Indian laws and policies.
The sovereignty of tribes was fully recognized by European colonial powers and initially, by the United
States.").
1
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will be generalized in this article for the sake of brevity, but there are salient
characteristics for the majority of these nations. 3  The tribal political structures are
interwoven with the social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic aspects of the
communities they serve. 4 The values inherent in Tribal Nations have a distinct effect on
the process by which the people chose to create and maintain government. For Tribal
Nations, government is outside of a social contract or a question of linear evolutionary
development.
5
Rather, tribal government in its historical sense was first and foremost based upon
relationship and the family structure within a worldview of spiritual connectedness.
6
The roles of men and women were respected and given generally separate realms of
governance although overlap was possible dependent upon individual personalities.
7
Organizations within tribal societies served the various functions of governmental
agencies (i.e. akicita [warrior] societies which are akin to current law enforcement, clan
structure which carried out specific group regulatory functions, and women's societies
focused on value preservation). 8 Beginning in this historical context, Tribal Nations did
not have a tax on citizenry because the citizenry voluntarily contributed to support each
other and the functions of government.
One of the most well-known values of Tribal Nations is the widespread practice of
wealth sharing exemplified in the "give-away" and known as the potlatch in the
northwest.9  At any significant point of life (i.e., acceptance of a leadership position,
3. See Sharon O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 14 (U. Oklahoma Press 1989) ("Despite
differences in structure, however, traditional tribal governments shared certain values, ideas of leadership, and
styles of decision making.").
4. See Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian
Sovereignty 18 (U. Texas Press 1998) ("Within an Indian tribal society... the simple fact of being born
establishes both citizenship and, as the individual grows, a homogeneity of purpose and outlook. Customs,
rituals, and traditions are a natural part of life, and individuals grow into an acceptance of them, eliminating the
need for formal articulation of the rules of Indian tribal society.").
5. Id. at 17-18.
The most profound and persistent element that distinguishes Indian ways of governing from
European-American forms is the very simple fact that non-Indians have tended to write down and
record all the principles and procedures that they believe essential to the foundation and operation of
a government. The Indians, on the other hand, benefiting from a religious, cultural, social, and
economic homogeneity in their tribal societies, have not found it necessary to formalize their
political institutions by describing them in a document.
Id.
6. Jerry H. Gill, Native American Worldviews 178 (Humanity Bks. 2002) ("The thread that held these two
aspects of community life, familial and political, together was the ceremonial pattern.").
7. Most Tribal Nations have accounts of women warriors engaging in war and accounts of men who
participated successfully in culinary arts and such.
8. See Celia Barnes, Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795 28 (Rosemont 2003).
The political organization of groups was diverse, as loyalties were based on varied sources of
obligation and affinity. In groups where clan ties were strong (among the Iroquois and Muskogees,
for example), they formed the deepest bonds of obligation. Clans were seen as a source of power,
membership assuring otherwise independent individuals a broad base of allies. These kinship ties
were extended and strengthened through marriage and trade and united residents of different
villages. The clans were organized to promote the social and political welfare of their members.
Id.
9. See Marcel Mauss, The Gift 32-37 (Norton & Co. 1967) (describing the potlatch system of the Tlingit
and Haida).
No less important is the role which honour plays in the transactions of the Indians. Nowhere else is
[Vol. 43:43
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birth of a child, success in hunting, etc.), the family celebrating held a give-away and all
but essential personal and spiritual items were given to fellow citizens at large. This
distribution of income was voluntary and expected to show proper gratitude for a life
event and to practice the art of generosity. 10 The extended family joined in and donated
items for the give-away. There was no fear that destitution followed the give-away
because in due course another give-away would be held and so on. The cycle of the
give-away provided honor to those who gave and provided a livelihood for those who
received. In this closed circuit, each segment of society was interdependent as those
skilled and talented rose to leadership by fully giving to those who were needy. "1
In addition, the giving and receiving of gifts created relationships that expanded
trade circles leading to commerce networks to support the tribe's continued prosperity. 12
Well-developed trade networks reached from coast to coast in North America carrying a
variety of products including "pipe clay, copper, com, nets, and rope." 13 Extravagant
wealth accumulation was viewed as antithetical to tribal existence. However, tribal
members did enjoy prosperity, participated in extensive routes comprised of trading
markets, 14 established trading practices, and had ample leisure time. 15  In essence,
the prestige of an individual as closely bound up with expenditure, and with the duty of returning
with interest gifts received in such a way that the creditor becomes the debtor.... Progress up the
social ladder is made in this way not only for oneself but also for one's family. Thus in a system of
this kind much wealth is continually being consumed and transferred. Such transfers may if desired
be called exchange or even commerce or sale; but it is an aristocratic type of commerce
characterized by etiquette and generosity; moreover, when it is carried out in a different spirit for
immediate gain, it is viewed with the greatest disdain.
Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
10. See Waziyatawin Angela Wilson, Remember This!: Dakota Decolonization and the Eli Taylor
Narratives 174 (U. Nebraska Press 2005).
On this topic Ella Deloria wrote: "Giving was glorified. The formal 'give-away' was a bonafide
Dakota institution. Naturally it followed that things changed hands with readiness when the
occasion demanded, since the best teaching said things were less important than people; that pride
lay in honoring relatives, rather than in amassing goods for oneself; that a man who failed to
participate in the giving customs was a suspicious character, something less than a human being."
Id. (footnote omitted).
11. Royal B. Hassick, The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society 36-38 (U. Oklahoma Press 1964).
"The result was that, rather than being outright burdens to society, the indigent Sioux actually became
necessary vehicles whereby the successful men gained social status." Id. at 37.
12. See Gerald Betty, Comanche Society Before the Reservation 116 (Texas A&M U. Press 2002).
Thus, Comanches responded positively to demonstrations of social behavior like that involved in
gift giving. American traders, unfamiliar with the ways of Indians, quickly learned the positive
effects of providing their hosts with gifts. In this way persons without any kinship or other social
connections to the Comanches could begin to establish such ties through which commerce could be
conducted.
Id.
13. John L. Williams, Paving the Way for the Future: Potential Structures for Economic Development, 2
UCLA Indigenous Peoples' J. L., Culture & Resistance 59, 61 (2005).
14. See Helen Hornbeck Tanner, The Land and Water Communication Systems of the Southeastern Indians,
in Powhatan 's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast 27 (Gregory A. Waselkov et al. eds., U. Nebraska
Press 2006).
[T]here were also intertribal contacts utilizing trails and canoe routes over distances of several
hundred miles, extending in the case of war parties and diplomatic missions to 1,000 or 1,500 miles.
These longer routes formed a network that also had a bearing on life in the individual villages. The
entire communication system, composed of local subsystems, hubs, or intermediate terminals, and
connections with other networks, can be roughly outlined with the view of demonstrating the wide 3
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voluntary wealth distribution was the basis for the functioning of tribal government
rather than externally imposed demands for pro rata shares of individual tribal member
income.
II. INTERACTION OF TRIBAL NATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
When the Europeans came to North America, they brought with them their
worldviews and laws as developed through centuries of conquest and empire
construction and destruction. 16 The British realized early on that diplomatic relations
were necessary with the larger tribal governments and entered into treaty relations.
17
The first interactions between Tribal Nations and the European colonies were intense
learning experiences on both sides. The educated among the Europeans greatly admired
the tribal political structures and recognized the sovereignty inherent in the Tribal
Nations. By adopting the Tribal Nations' concept of incorporating other groups into the
central government, Euro-Americans constructed the present federal and state balance
called the United States. 18  To maintain a physical presence in North America, the
leaders within the colonies, and then the United States, acknowledged the need to reach
peaceful agreements with Tribal Nations. Hence, the era of treaty making by the United
States commenced.
Through these treaties, the United States expanded and asserted its ability to
govern the influx of European immigrants and captive Africans under its obligations
through treaties with various Tribal Nations. Early on, the federal government, in the
Articles of Confederation, and later in the U.S. Constitution, legislated itself as the sole
power to enter into relations with Tribal Nations. The reason was simple-if individual
states were to enter into commercial relationships and agreements to acquire territory,
then the land base of the United States would be threatened and a rival Euro-American
government could spring into existence. This has been the motivation of the federal
relationship between the Tribal Nations and the United States: The reaching of peaceful
agreements to establish and consolidate territorial jurisdiction for the federal government
of the United States.
19
range of contacts accessible to southeastern Indians.
Id. at 26.
15. See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed?
80 Or. L. Rev. 757, 777-90 (2001).
16. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourse
of Conquest (Oxford U. Press 1990).
17. See O'Brien, supra n. 3, at 48.
18. See Robert W. Venables, American Indian Influences on the America of the Founding Fathers in Exiled
in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution 115-24 (Oren R. Lyons & John
C. Mohawk eds., Clear Light 1992).
19. It should be noted that the majority of Tribal Nations subscribed to a worldview that included a type of
recognition of territorial land ownership. Tribal members respected territories and flexible boundaries for the
replenishment of land and the changing localities of tribal sustenance (rotating fields, migrating herds,
acknowledged family plots, designated ceremonial grounds per family, etc.). In terms of treaties, the Tribal
Nations did not knowingly relinquish all activity on the lands described therein. See e.g. Minn. v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 175-76 (1999) (holding that the Tribes reserved hunting and fishing
rights on ceded lands); Wash. v. Wash. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S 658, 684-85 (1979) (holding that
the Tribes reserved to themselves all fishing in accustomed places for the continued survival of the Tribes); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band v. Wis., 775 F. Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that the Tribe reserved hunting
[Vol. 43:43
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Within the U.S. Constitution, Tribal Nations were mentioned in terms of not being
taxed and as engaged with Congress in terms of commerce. 2 1 The treaties entered into
by the United States were characterized as the "supreme law of the land."22  Tribal
Nations by and large did not engage in ministerial documentation of the treaties entered
into with the United States, but recorded their interpretation of the treaties in oral
traditions. 23  As the United States encroached on Tribal Nations further west of the
eastern seaboard, treaty making with the Tribes continued as a process by which to assert
the United States' relationship as primary over other European nations. Once the United
States was assured of its dominion against other European nations, the agreements it had
entered into with Tribal Nations were no longer regarded as necessary and of primary
importance by the federal government.
24
In fact, the United States began seeking military dominance over the Tribal
Nations with which it had reached peaceful agreements. 25  This shift from peaceful
relations to antagonistic military offensiveness can be partially attributed to the assertion
of state and settlers' claims to tribal lands and the subsequent choice of the United States
and fishing rights in the lands ceded by treaty).
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at § 8.
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes;...
Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id. at art. IV.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. IV.
23. See Kent Nerbum & Louise Mengelkoch, Native American Wisdom 73-74 (New World Lib. 1991). As
stated by Black Hawk of the Sauk Tribe:
Here for the first time, I touched the goose quill to the treaty-not knowing, however, that by that
act I consented to give away my village! Had that been explained to me, I should have opposed it,
and never would have signed their treaty, as my recent conduct has clearly proven.
What do we know of the laws and customs of the white people? They might buy our bodies for
dissection, and we would touch the goose quill to confirm it, without knowing what we were doing.
This was the case with myself and my people in touching the goose quill the first time.
Id.
24. See Felix Cohen, Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 1.03[9] (2005 ed., Lexis 2005) (marking
the official policy of the termination of treaty making with Tribal Nations through the Appropriations Act of
March 3, 1871).
25. See. Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (Holt,
Rinehart & Winston 1971). 5
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to wage war on Tribal Nations rather than to contain the state citizens and
governments. 26  With the advent of military oppression of Tribal Nations, the legal
relationship was skewed in the United States' tribunals and in the implementation of
federal policies towards Tribal Nations. 27 However, Tribal Nations have continued to
honor the underlying premise of the treaty-making process by not declaring war against
the United States and taking up arms. Tribal Nations throughout the period of outright
military offensiveness fought to protect their citizenry, but did not resort to the full-
fledged aggression invoked by the United States cavalry and local Euro-American citizen
armies. The ensuing holocaust of Indian people has yet to be fully assessed in terms of
the numbers massacred and tortured throughout this period.28
This tragic period in the history of relations between the Tribal Nations and the
United States commencing in the early 1800s only began marginally lessening with the
federal policies of the 1970s. From the 1800s to the late 1900s, the United States
engaged in experimental social and cultural modification practices on Tribal Nations in
an attempt to "kill the Indian, but save the man." 2 9  These practices were federalized
through the policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). This federal bureau
attempted to mandate complete control over tribal life and welfare by its firm grip on the
funds designated to Tribal Nations in treaties. The BIA regulated everything from tribal
education and tribal government to tribal resources and health care. 30
From this concept of federal supervision of Tribal Nations, the legal doctrine of the
federal fiduciary duty over Indian affairs was adopted. To further enhance this fiduciary
duty, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Congress had "guardianship power" over
the Tribal Nations by incredible extension of the only language in the U.S. Constitution
remotely tied to interaction with Tribes, the language on regulating commerce pursuant
to Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.3 1 This is wholly contrary to the viewpoints of
26. See e.g. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (holding that Georgia could not impose its laws upon the
Cherokee Nation and dismissed the state's charges against a missionary within Cherokee lands with consent
from the Tribe); Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (holding that the Tribal Nation seeking relief from
the laws of the state of Georgia was not a "foreign nation" and thus was barred from suit).
27. See O'Brien, supra n. 3, at 272 (detailing the creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1824 under the
Department of War to its transfer in 1849 to the Department of the Interior).
28. See Winona LaDuke, All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life 1-3 (South End Press
1999).
29. This phrase has been attributed to General Pratt, the Superintendent of the first Indian boarding school,
the Carlisle Indian School. See Barbara Landis, Carlisle Indian Industrial School History, http://home.epix.net
/-landis/histry.html (accessed Mar. 12, 2008).
30. See Kirke Kickingbird et al., Indian Sovereignty, Native American Sovereignty 26 (John R. Wunder ed.,
1996).
The BIA Manual consists of 42 Titles and 57 Supplements. In "loose-leaf form it covers one entire
book shelf." It is a "confusing, often contradictory, and generally inefficient compilation of policy
and procedure ranging from generally adequate to absolutely unfathomable." This incredible
morass of government regulations often makes it easier for federal administrators to illegally
interfere in the internal affairs of Indian nations.
Id.
31. US. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,383-84 (1886).
It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress. These Indians tribes are the wards of
the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found
[Vol. 43:43
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the Tribal Nations who remain inherently sovereign regardless of the United States'
judicial interpretation of its founding document or its adoption of similar legislation.
As the case law and legislation were formulated concerning Tribal Nations, the
U.S. government was at liberty to define its relationship through its own tribunals and
government halls towards the Tribes. Furthermore, the United States has, under its so-
called fiduciary duty, represented tribal interests based on its biased view of the Tribes'
best interests, often from an untenable position of conflict with the Tribes. 32 Thus, the
United States has acted like a colonial power over tribal life, tribal resources, and the
tribal individual to the point where tribal people were determined to be incompetent
wards to be overseen by the BIA.
Constructing a rationale for total colonial control over Tribal Nations, the U.S.
Supreme Court fostered the outright derogation of the treaty agreements between Tribal
Nations and the federal government. By holding that tribal members were of a class
without full legal rights as incompetent under U.S. laws,33 the U.S. Supreme Court
paved the way for the colonial disempowerment of tribal government and the consequent
stripping of tribal resources. As sovereign nations, Tribes have been independent of the
U.S. Constitution and indirectly impacted by U.S. Indian policy.
With the judicial activism propagating a colonial philosophy over tribal peoples
and resources, the express provisions of the U.S. Constitution were disregarded,
including the passing reference that Indians were not taxed. Tribal Nations as separate
sovereigns native to North America were not part of the formation of the United States
and the U.S. founding document, the U.S. Constitution, recognized the separate status of
Tribes and individual Indians. With the express adherence of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Congress to a colonial philosophy of seizing tribal resources by the threat of
military domination and the creation of legal fictions as to tribal member competency, a
justification for the taxation of tribal resources, land, and individuals was built on this
paternalistic assumption of authority over these resources.
Over the last sixty years, the states forming the United States have petitioned the
federal government incessantly to override the treaty relationships with the Tribal
Nations. To the dishonor of the United States, its federal lawmakers and judiciary have
granted in most circumstances those petitions in gross violation of the federal agreements
reached with Tribal Nations.
Federal and state taxation was never conferred through treaties. Not only has the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal imposition of taxes against Tribes and tribal
members, 34 but it has found ways to allow states to impose taxes as well. 3 5  The
are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
Id.
32. See Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department ofJustice's Conflict of Interest in Representing
Native American Tribes, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1307 (2003).
33. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
34. See e.g. Co. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992).
35. See e.g. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. N.M, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 7
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Supreme Court's pronouncement of dual taxing authority between Tribes and states
glosses over the fact that the federal government has asserted taxing authority as well.
Thus, there are potentially three levels of tax for businesses entering reservations. The
Tribes as sovereigns must support and maintain tribal government through tribal taxation
and have been put in the untenable position of imposing a third level of taxation on tribal
members.
When the Tribes acting in their sovereign capacity have asserted their taxing
authority within reservation boundaries, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a race-based
exception to tribal taxes for non-Indians. 36 This same distinction has not prevented
states from asserting retail taxes on tribal members entering into transactions with state
regulated businesses. This double standard for Tribal Nations reveals an inherent racial
bias by the United States in terms of the original peoples of this continent and that the
underlying mentality of colonialism breeds further incursion into the tribal domain.
III. SPECIFIC TAXATION OF TRIBAL NATIONS AND TRIBAL TERRITORY BY THE FEDERAL
AND STATE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Over time, the tax-exempt status of reservation Indians has been subject to attack
through litigation. In response to this litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to
recognize the separate sovereign treaty relationship between the Tribal Nations and the
United States and has judicially constructed limitations on the Tribes' taxing
jurisdictions through race-based distinctions. As a result of these court decisions, the
Tribes have, through narrow jurisdictional classifications, been subject to the erosion of
their taxing jurisdiction. In certain areas, the U.S. Supreme Court has further hindered
the economic development of Tribes by judicially authorizing federal and state taxation
within the tribal taxing jurisdiction. This process will be followed as it has developed
over the last century within the United States to the present.
A. Taxation of the Tribal Land Base
Taxation of property has been the foundation of European practices of collecting
revenue to operate governments. Once Europeans crossed the Atlantic, tribal lands were
actively sought after for homesteading and acquisition by state governments before the
concern over taxation began. When the United States imposed military control over the
Tribal Nations, the traditional homelands of many Tribes were settled by Euro-
Americans while the Tribal Nations were relocated on lands "set apart" for their use.3 7
These lands set apart were termed reservations, Indian communities, tribal corporations,
rancherias, or Executive Order trust lands depending on the U.S. representatives
encountered and which part of the continent the Tribal Nation met with these
representatives. These lands now fall under the general heading "Indian country." 38
Because of the sovereignty of Tribes, these lands were exempt from all forms of taxation
36. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483
(1976).
37. See Cohen, supra n. 24, at 45-54 (describing removal treaties and legislation in the 1800s).
38. See id. at 188 (citing to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000), which legally defines Indian country).
[Vol. 43:43
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and under federal restriction from sale with the occupancy of Tribal Nations. This policy
was unilaterally and sharply changed in 1887 with the passage of the Dawes Act
(popularly known as the "General Allotment Act").
39
Under the Dawes Act, the federal policy focused on breaking up the tribal land
base from community property and territories to individual allotments as a means to
assimilate tribal members to the lifestyle of Euro-American farmers. Specifically, the
Allotment Act provided for 160 acres to be apportioned to each head of household and
any other lands after this apportionment within the control of the Tribes was regarded as
"surplus" which the federal government sold to homesteaders. 40  Additionally, the
Allotment Act held that the individual allotments were in a federal trust status for
twenty-five years preventing the sale of the lands. The stated purpose for the trust period
was to familiarize tribal members with the European concept of land ownership. 4 1 The
subsequent amendments by the Burke Act of 1906 allowed for allottees to be declared
"competent" by area BIA officials for the alienation of lands formerly held in trust
status.42 A second wave of dispossession occurred as a result of the 1906 Burke Act
passed by Congress providing for competency hearings to determine an Indian fit for the
purpose of selling lands to an interested buyer.4 3 From 1887 to 1934, the loss of lands
from tribal membership to non-Indian ownership represented two-thirds of all allotments
and near twenty-seven million acres.
44
Throughout this period, tribal members were largely without adequate resources to
provide for their families and any means by which to gain resources were utilized
leading to the selling of the land allotments. From the start, the General Allotment Act
was doomed for failure as a means to provide individual landholdings for tribal
members, but was a ravishing success in providing quick access to the reserved
landholdings of Tribal Nations by homesteaders and other Euro-Americans regardless of
treaty language reserving these same lands to the Tribes. One of the logical
consequences of dispossessing Tribal Nations of their landholdings and deeding specific
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341,348, 349, 354, 381.
40. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 13 (1995).
Despite the devastating effects of fee patents, the 27 million patented acres lost to non-Indians
represented only about one-third of the tribal losses during the allotment era. More than twice as
much land-some 60 million acres-was lost under the surplus lands program. The General
Allotment Act provided that once reservation lands were allotted in severalty, the remaining
"surplus" lands could, at the discretion of the President, be opened to non-Indian settlement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
41. See Stacy L. Leeds, Borrowing from Blackacre: Expanding Tribal Land Bases through the Creation of
Future Interests and Joint Tenancies, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 827, 830 (2004) (noting that the U.S. Congress
completely ignored the property values of tribal members in passing the General Allotment Act).
42. See Cohen, supra n. 24, at 1042.
43. Id.
44. Id. As one commentator observed:
Between 1887 and 1934, the tribal lands of 118 reservations were allotted, although many
reservations, particularly in the Southwest, escaped allotment. From 1887 to 1900, the federal
government approved 53,168 allotments, totaling nearly five million acres, and almost 36 million
acres had been allotted by 1920. By 1934, approximately 27 million acres, or two-thirds of all the
land allotted to tribal members, had passed by sale or involuntary transfer fror. the Indian fee owner
into non-Indian land ownership.
Id. (footnotes omitted). 9
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small tracts to individual tribal members was the devastation of tribal economies and the
destruction of access to areas of abundant food and other resources. Thus, the General
Allotment Act commenced generational impoverishment of tribal members wherever
lands were allotted and consequently, tribal economies destroyed.4 5
The policy of allotment that began in 1887 was halted with the passage of the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.46 Heralded in was the next federal policy of
preserving a vestige of tribal cultural autonomy replacing the former policy of total
assimilation into Euro-American society. The IRA set in motion the reorganization of
tribal governments modeled after a BIA standardized constitutional form.4 7 To ensure
that tribal members were bound by these constitutional forms, the BIA officials
instigated tribal votes where tribal members were required to vote against adoption of the
constitutional structure to prevent adoption as the official form of tribal government.
This negative vote process clearly cuts against the democratic form of government
claimed by the United States. In dealing with Tribal Nations, the U.S. has resorted to
any means necessary tactics to pursue its agenda of total colonial domination.
The acceptance of these types of BIA-recognized tribal governments resulted in
the receipt of federal monies based on social welfare programs. Several Tribal Nations
refused to succumb to federal pressure to adopt these boilerplate constitutional models,
but eventually did accept a distant relative of the constitutional form. Unfortunately, the
BIA-mandated tribal government models lacked the checks and balances system
celebrated as the saving grace for the United States in its three branches of government.
Rather, the BIA boilerplates concentrated the legislative, executive, and judicial
functions all in one body, which over time would be a source of on-going contention
within Tribal Nations. 48 The passage of the IRA signaled a halt before the complete
dispossession of tribal peoples to their land, however, the havoc wreaked by the
Allotment Act proved a longstanding legacy that Tribes still contend with at present.
Tribal Nations must deal with complex jurisdictional issues due to the
consequences of the Allotment Act as well as specific congressional legislation imposing
regulation on the tribal land base. The imposition of the United States into the sovereign
domain of the Tribal Nations must be the beginning point for evaluating all such
jurisdictional issues. Prior to the creation of the United States, the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of separate Tribal Nations was of no great concern and was accepted without
argument.
Since the founding of the United States, new U.S. laws and regulations have been
developed which purport to control tribal territory. These federal directives evolved
without tribal knowledge or input and therefore, lack legitimacy from the tribal
viewpoint as external assertion of colonial control. In addition, these encroachments
appear after the majority of the tribal land base had been appropriated by the United
States to itself in direct contravention of the sovereign status of Tribal Nations and the
45. See Leeds, supra n. 41, at 832.
46. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79.
47. See Deloria & Lytle, supra n. 4, at 141-43.
48. See Robert Odawi Porter, Sovereignty, Colonialism, and the Indigenous Nations: A Reader 523-24
(Carolina Academic Press 2005).
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fiduciary duty claimed by the federal government over Tribal Nations.
Tribal lands have become a source of complexity on jurisdictional grounds. The
original understanding of the Tribal Nations remains the same-that tribal lands are
exempt from state and federal taxation based on inherent tribal sovereignty. Three cases,
popularly referred to as The Kansas Indian cases, 49 were certified to the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1866 based on the attempt of the state of Kansas to tax the lands of the
Shawnee,50 the Wea,5 1 and the Miamis. 52 The question presented was whether the tribal
lands that were held in severalty, as opposed to those that were held in common, were
subject to state taxation.53 The Court held that pursuant to treaties with the Kansas
Indians, the tribal lands were not subject to taxation and that Kansas entered the Union
under the agreement to respect the title of the Indians under federal protection.
54
Conferring rights and privileges on these Indians cannot affect their situation, which can
only be changed by treaty stipulation, or a voluntary abandonment of their tribal
organization. As long as the United States recognizes their national character they are
under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn
from the operation of the State laws.
55
Ten days later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the state taxation issue as it pertained
to the Seneca Nation and the state of New York. The case popularly known as the New
York Indians upheld the tax-exempt status of the reservations at issue there.
56
The question of the taxation of Indian lands, while in their tribal organizations, by the State
authorities, has been before us this term in several cases from the State of Kansas, and after
a very full consideration of the subject the power was denied.
57
This recognition of the Tribal Nations' sovereign status by the United States judiciary
was to change over time. After the allotment era, the status of reservation lands was
more vulnerable to state and local efforts at taxation. However, it has not been until the
late 1980s and the 1990s that the impact of the emboldened state and local efforts has
gained a solid foothold in the U.S. federal courts.
In a 1992 groundbreaking case, the U.S. Supreme Court changed the status of
Indian fee-patented reservation land on the basis of the former allotment policy. In
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,58 the
county sought to impose two taxes on fee-patented reservation land.59 The first was an
ad valorem tax and the second was an excise tax in the event of sale of the reservation
land.60 The Court held that the reservation land had been allotted under the General
49. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
50. Id. at 751-57 (reporting of Blue Jacket v. The Bd of Commrs. of the Co. of Johnson).
51. Id. at 757-59 (reporting of Yellow Beaver v. The Bd of Commrs. of the Co. of Miami).
52. Id. at 759-61 (reporting of Wanzopeah v. The Bd of Commrs. of the Co. of Miami).
53. Id. at 737.
54. The Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. at 757.
55. Id.
56. In reN.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866).
57. Id. at 769.
58. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
59. Id. at 253.
60. Id. 11
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Allotment Act and was therefore subject to § 5 of the Act which stated that upon
expiration of the trust period, the land would be "discharged of said trust and free of all
charge or incumbrance [sic] whatsoever. ,,61 This was interpreted by the Court as
coupled with the Burke Act proviso allowing for competency determinations to remove
land from trust status and then subjecting the fee-patented reservation land "to
assessment and forced sale for taxes."
62
The U.S. Supreme Court soundly rejected the assertion by the Yakima Nation that
the subsequent policies of the IRA of 1934 reversed the policies of the Allotment Act
and returned the status of the land to its original exempt status. 63 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the fee-patented land was subject to the county's ad valorem tax 64 and
forced sale if the taxes went unpaid. In essence, the Court failed to recognize the
aboriginal status of the land as not taxed based on tribal ownership and sought to
reassign the land after the federal trust restriction expired to state jurisdiction status.
As for the excise tax on the sale of fee-patented reservation land, the Court found
that the Burke Act proviso only addressed taxation of land and not the sale of land. 65
The excise tax was void because it constituted a direct tax "upon the Indian's activity of
selling the land."
66
The few remaining lands that the Tribal Nations still have which have been fee-
patented may now be subject to local ad valorem taxes as a result of the Yakima opinion
and can be lost in forced sales to collect those county taxes.6 7 This has left the Tribes in
a vulnerable position since they must not only provide services to tribal members, but the
land base upon which they maintain the tribal government may be subject to local
taxation if the land was part of the allotment process prior to 1936 and is not currently in
trust status with the U.S. federal government. This forces the Tribes to maintain the
tribal land base by applying to the Department of the Interior for each fee-patented parcel
to be placed into trust status under federal restriction. The aboriginal inherent
characteristics of land owned by a Tribe has been disregarded as the United States has
imposed the further requirement that the land be placed into trust status with the U.S.
federal government to be exempt from federal and state taxation-a paradox in terms of
maintaining the tribal sovereign status of land as tribally owned and tax exempt in
regards to the subordinate governments of the U.S. through a federal trust process. 68
61. Id. at 263 n. 3 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 348).
62. Id. at 264.
63. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 264.
64. Id. at 270.
65. Id. at 269.
66. Id.
67. See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
809, 888 (1996) ("As a result of Yakima County, Washington could not only tax and foreclose upon fee land
owned by members of a tribe, but also land owned by the tribal government itself.... With scarcely a nod
toward the Indian Reorganization Act and congressional intent, Yakima County resurrected a devastating
ramification of the Dawes Act: once again, states had a means to appropriate tribal lands.").
68. See Lance Morgan, Morgan: Ending the Curse of Trust Land, http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/
content.cfmid=1096410559 (Mar. 18, 2005).
Why not give us back our land? Title to trust land should be returned to tribes and individuals in fee
under a new tribal status. This new tribal status must confer permanent jurisdiction, complete with
full taxation powers, to the tribe, ensuring that the land will always be subject to tribal jurisdiction
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Furthermore, the ability of Tribes to place land into trust status has been under
serious attack recently in Congress and through the BIA revised regulations. Various
proposals have circulated in the several sessions in the late 1990s and early 2000s to
force Tribes to agree to state taxation compacts on other tribal revenue sources prior to
qualifying for federal approval to put reservation fee lands back into trust status.69 State
and local governments must be contacted by Tribal Nations for off-reservation fee land
applications for trust status, which allows this type of strong-armed negotiation against
the tribal interests.
70
B. Taxation of Oil and Gas Production within Indian Country
The earliest means of deriving income from the lands upon which Tribal Nations
were relegated to was from leasing the land itself. In many instances, the federal
government sought to locate the Tribal Nations on land that was not attractive to
homesteaders where possible. Ironically, this resulted in many Tribal Nations having
rights to land that was later found to contain oil, gas, and other mineral deposits valued
by the Euro-Americans. The first real push to tax Indian lands was from the recognition
of oil and gas underlying tribal lands.7 1 As early as 1891, Congress authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to oversee the leasing of tribal lands for grazing and mining,
thus acting in accordance with the colonial approach to depleting native lands and their
resources. 72 In 1924, Congress enacted further legislation that divided the profits from
unallotted reservation lands' oil and gas production with the surrounding states. 73 This
initial intrusion into the unallotted lands of Tribal Nations in terms of income and
taxation sets the stage for the subsequent encroachments by state and local governments
into the Tribes' economic foundations.
The 1924 Act provided expressly for state taxation of oil and gas produced from
Indian lands.74 The basis of this authority to tax is not stated nor was a legal challenge
considered for almost sixty years. The Act provided the states with the ability to tax the
oil and gas production:
Provided, That the production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be
taxed by the State in which said lands are located in all respects the same as production on
unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to cause to be
paid the tax so assessed against the royalty interests on said lands: Provided, however, That
regardless of the race of the landowner. In one move, we can liberate Indian country economically
and politically.
Id.
69. See e.g. Mike L. Graham, American Indian Community Standing Up against "One Nation ": Statement
from United Native America, http://www.unitednativeamerica.com/press/onenation.html (Dec. 27, 2004).
70. See25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2007).
71. For a comprehensive examination of the fraudulent means employed to control oil and gas revenues at
the expense of Tribal Nations, see Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of the Five Civilized
Tribes (Princeton U. Press 1972) (illustrating the history of the state of Oklahoma and its dispossession and
treatment of the Tribal Nations living in the area).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (providing that upon &7athorization by a council speaking on behalf of Indians, leases of
five years could be entered into for grazing purposes and ten years for mining purposes).
73. Id. at § 398.
74. Id.
13
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such tax shall not become a lien or charge of any kind or character against the land or the
property of the Indian owner.
75
After the U.S. Attorney General in 1922 opined that Executive Order Reservations were
not subject to the leasing provisions of other federal lands, Congress amended the 1924
Act in 1927 to provide for oil and gas leases on Executive Order Reservations. 76 This
state of affairs occurred based on the federal approach to tribal lands as an exploitable
resource, although the federal government asserted its fiduciary obligation to Tribal
Nations as the justification for such exploitation.
In 1938, Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act 77 with the stated
purposes of: 1) providing uniformity in the leasing of Indian lands, 2) harmonizing the
leasing of such lands with the IRA of 1934, and 3) providing that the Indian owners
receive the greatest return on the income derived from their property. 78 However, the
1938 Act did nothing to upset the state taxation of oil and gas production on reservation
land where the Act expressly provided that the Tribal Nations receive only royalty
income.
The first major challenge to the oil and gas taxation scheme on reservation lands
did not occur until the 1980s as the Tribal Nations became versed in oil and gas law and
the accumulated wrongs that were enacted as legislation by the United States Congress.
Ironically, one of the first challenges to taxation for on-reservation oil and gas
production was aimed squarely at tribal taxation, and oil companies brought the
challenge. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,79 oil corporations challenged the right
of the Tribal Nation to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production on Executive
Order Reservation land.
80
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an exhaustive opinion, concluded that the Tribal
Nation had the inherent authority to impose taxes on the production from its own lands,
that state taxation did not preempt tribal taxation, and that the taxation by the Tribe did
not violate the Commerce Clause. 81 In a footnote, the Court stated that it was not
reaching the issue of whether the states had taxing authority over on-reservation oil and
gas production under a lease issued pursuant to the 1938 Act.
82
Consequently, the Tribal Nations were recognized as having the taxing authority,
for at a minimum, on the same production that the states had been allowed to tax. Thus,
the decision placed oil and gas production on reservation lands subject to both tribal and
state severance taxation. In essence, Merrion illustrated that the U.S. colonizing power
could not find a justification to totally supersede the tribal taxing authority, but still
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. The 1924 Act was amended to provide that the Tribal Nations on Executive Order Reservations would
receive royalties which would be placed into accounts with the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the
Tribes and for the costs associated with oil and gas operations on reservation lands. Id. at § 398b.
77. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g.
78. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Ft. Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd of Oil & Gas Conserv. of St. of Mont.,
792 F.2d 782, 796 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting 25 U.S.C. §396a).
79. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
80. Id. at 133.
81. Id. at 159.
82. Id. at 151 n. 17.
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found a way to uphold state taxation on the tribal resources. The further question of
whether state taxation itself was applicable to revenue generated from reservation land
oil and gas production was not addressed for another seven years.
In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians,83 the Blackfeet Tribal Nation
successfully challenged the state taxation of tribal royalty income. 84  The state of
Montana argued that the oil and gas lease at issue executed pursuant to the 1938 Act was
within the taxing provisions of the 1924 Act and that the subsequent 1938 Act should not
be construed so as to repeal the state taxing provisions of the former Act.85 The U.S.
Supreme Court, relying on specific canons of construction, held that without "clear
congressional consent to taxation, .... the State may not tax Indian royalty income from
leases issued pursuant to the 1938 Act." 86 The Blackfeet Tribal Nation's case was
decided in 1985, therefore, based on the case's reasoning, state taxation on tribal royalty
income had been illegally allowed from 1938 until 1985, for forty-seven years while the
Tribal Nations were said to be within a fiduciary relationship with the United States.
The strong dissent in the Montana case foreshadowed the second case concerning
the oil and gas leases of the Jicarilla Apache. 87 Justice Stevens' dissent 88 in Merrion
maintained that the tribal power to tax rested solely on the tribal power to exclude and
did not encompass renegotiation of oil and gas leases. 89 The dissent asserted that once
the Tribe had allowed the non-Indian lessee on tribal land, there could be no further
conditions of that entry, such as subsequent taxation. 90 Furthermore, the dissent found it
relevant that at the time of the leases the Tribal Nation did not have a tax code and
should not assert its right to tax the prior lessee once a tax code was developed. 9 1
In the 1989 Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico9 2 case, an oil company
challenged the state's taxation of oil and gas production on the Jicarilla Apache
Reservation.93 The U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
upheld the state's taxation as permitted by the 1938 Act and that as an Executive Order
reservation, the Jicarilla Apache lands had historically been subject to state taxation for
oil and gas production. 94 The majority stated in a footnote that the Montana decision
was not to the contrary and stood for the narrow proposition that states could not directly
tax Tribes.95 Rather, the Court stated that both the state and the Tribal Nation share
concurrent jurisdiction through the federal scheme. 96 To further substantiate its holding,
the majority relied on three other factors: 1) the state provides services to the lessees and
83. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
84. Id. at 768.
85. Id. at 765.
86. Id. at 768.
87. Id.
88. Mont., 455 U.S. at 159-90 (Stevens, J., Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 186.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 188.
92. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id. at 182.
95. Id. at 183 n. 14.
96. Id. at 189.
15
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the tribal members,9 7 2) there need be no equality between taxes paid and services
provided,9 8 and 3) the Tribal Nation had not shown its ability to attract oil and gas leases
had diminished because of the state tax.
9 9
With the holding in Cotton Petroleum, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the
breach of fiduciary duty by the federal government in permitting state taxation on tribal
lands at the outset. 100 In addition, the Court sanctioned the further injustice that income
derived from tribal lands would be burdened by state taxation in addition to tribal
taxation on the same source of production. 
10 1
C. Taxation of Tribal Economic Development Enterprises
Aside from oil and gas production, the Tribal Nations have followed other routes
in generating revenue to provide for tribal government and member services. In these
efforts, states have levied taxes on the Tribal Nations resulting in frequent litigation to
defend the status of tribal enterprises and income. As the case law has developed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly deferential to state revenue generating
justifications and antagonistic to tribal interests.
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,10 2 the state of New Mexico sought to impose
two taxes on a tribal ski resort: A state sales tax for services or tangibles sold at the resort
and a compensating use tax on materials bought out of state to construct two ski lifts. 
103
The first issue before the Court was the status of the land upon which the ski resort was
built.104 The Tribal Nation, following the IRA's tribal corporation powers, leased the
land from the U.S. Forest Service with a loan pursuant to the IRA. 10 5 The land hosting
the ski area bordered on the Tribe's reservation, but was outside of the reservation
97. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 189-90.
98. Id. at 190.
99. Id. at 191.
100. See Charley Carpenter, Student Author, Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 639, 671 (1990).
Tribal economies clearly can be damaged by state taxation of non-Indian businesses that help
develop tribal resources. For this reason, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to allow state
taxation to encompass the reservations.... The decision in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico
reverses this general trend, making state taxation of non-Indian developers on the reservation the
norm, and the protection of tribal economies the exception.
Id.
101. See Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural Resource Development and State
Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 387,418 (1997).
The economic justification identified to allow tribal taxation of reservation natural resources do not
exist for state taxation. State taxes create barriers to tribal natural resources development. They
discourage private developers from entering into agreements with tribes and reduce the revenue
available to tribes through taxes of their own. The taxes siphon off natural resources rents to which
states have no moral or equitable claim-states neither own the extracted resource nor provide
substantial benefits to the taxed party. Most importantly, of course, state taxation thwarts
Congress's interest in protecting tribes and encouraging their economic and political independence.
Id.
102. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
103. Id. at 146-47.
104. Id. at 147-55.
105. Id. at 146, 158 n. 13.
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boundaries.] ° 6 The rule announced by the Court was: "Absent express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject
to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State."10 7
The Court rejected the claim that tribal economic development engaged in
pursuant to the IRA rendered that activity a federal instrumentality exempt from state
taxation.1°8 Rather, the Court noted that the purpose of the IRA was to "disentangle the
tribes from the official bureaucracy. ' 1° 9 Considering whether tribal income was taxable
by the state, the Court relied on prior decisions where the state and federal government
were permitted to tax a tribal member's share of income from tribal mineral resources
and where federal taxation on a tribal member's royalty income from oil lands was
allowed.1 10 Based upon this reasoning, the Court upheld the New Mexico gross receipts
tax on the income earned from the tribal ski resort as an off-reservation enterprise. 1 11
The second New Mexico tax, the compensating use tax, was aimed at the personal
property permanently attached to the leased property for the tribal ski resort. 112 Finding
that the property improvements "on the Tribe's tax-exempt land would certainly be
immune" from state taxation, the Court concluded that the state compensating use tax
was inappropriate as well for the permanent property improvements. 113
Therefore, in Mescalero, the U.S. Supreme Court did not attribute the status of the
Tribal Nation to the income of its economic enterprise and chose instead to rely on an
analogy to an individual Indian person going off-reservation as subject to state
jurisdiction. This decision signaled to all of Indian Country that Tribal Nations were to
be strictly limited to whatever parcels of land were retained after the previous allotment
era in terms of tax exemptions for business enterprises.
For Tribal Nations seeking to harvest timber as an income source, litigation arose
over the transporting of the logs to be sold. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,114 the state of Arizona attempted to impose two taxes (motor carrier license and
use fuel taxes) on a non-Indian logging company which operated exclusively on
reservation land and roads. 115 The Court set out a new test in this case to determine
whether state taxation was valid. 116 The first prong called for an examination into
federal law to determine whether the state tax was preempted on that ground.11 7 The
second relied on an inquiry into the "right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them."
' 118
106. Id.
107. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148-49.
108. Id. at 152-53.
109. Id. at 153.
110. Id. at 156-57 (citing to Leahy v. State Treas., 297 U.S. 420 (1936); Choteau v. Hurnet, 283 U.S. 691,
696-97 (1931)).
111. Id. at 157-58.
112. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 158.
113. Id.
114. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
115. Id. at 139-40.
116. Id. at 142-43.
117. ld. at 142.
118. Id. (citing to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 17
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To properly apply these prongs to the situation at hand, the Court defined its
analysis in the following terms:
[W]here, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in
activity on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant
federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the
notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal
independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of
state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law. 119
This particularized inquiry of interests demonstrated in the present case that federal
regulation over the tribal timber industry was extensive, comprehensive, and based on
decades of administration. 120 Therefore, the Court concluded that federal law preempted
the state's taxation for this tribal activity. 12 1 The Court remarked that an additional
consideration in their determination had been the failure of the state "to identify any
regulatory function or service performed by the State that would justify the assessment of
taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation."
' 122
While the Bracker case appeared a victory for Indian Country over the imposition
of state taxation, the Court in effect had placed a balancing of interests test into the tax-
exempt status of the Tribal Nations' income. 12 3 Because the test so heavily relies on
historical circumstances, it can only disfavor the Tribes as they seek to expand and
diversify their business enterprises. 124 The weighing of interests attributed to Tribal
Nations providing governmental and social services to tribal members should far
outweigh any justifications by the states in terms of imposing a similar tax on tribal lands
and activities. Ironically, one of the greatest determinative weights to preempt state
taxation is the presence of federal regulation over the tribal enterprise. Therefore, Tribes
in the final analysis either submit to federal regulation with consequent taxation or to
119. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
120. Id. at 148.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 148-49.
123. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power inside Indian Reservations with the
Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1105, 1155 ("The
balancing aspect of the preemption doctrine, like the congressional plenary power doctrine, cannot be legally
justified. Determining what constitutes interference with tribal self-government should not be left to an act of
judicial balancing. Instead, any exercise of state jurisdiction in Indian country, should be construed as an
interference with tribal self-government.").
124. See Deborah A. Geier, Essay: Power and Presumptions; Rules and Rhetoric; Institutions and Indian
Law, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 451,494.
Asking whether Congress has preempted the particular state action at issue or whether it has
delegated to tribes the particular power at issue.., allows both Congress and the Court to avoid
systematically and comprehensively defining tribal sovereignty as an independent matter.
Congress, which the Court insists has the plenary power to define tribal sovereignty, is reactive
only, periodically passing a narrow statute addressing a single issue, often to overturn or modify a
Supreme Court decision ostensibly made in the name of preemption by Congress. The disjointed
process used by Congress and the Supreme Court means that no systematic and enduring vision of
tribal sovereignty can result.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
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both federal and state imposition of regulation and taxation as adjudged in the U.S.
federal courts. In other words, there is no pure tribal preemption of either federal or state
regulation combined with taxation according to United States judicial determination.
D. Taxation in the Form of Payments through Tribal-State Gaming Compacts under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In 1988, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 125 became federal law and
purported to regulate the gaming operations in Indian Country under Tribal Nation
control. This novel piece of legislation both assumed federal jurisdiction over the
regulation of Indian gaming and then in a totally unprecedented fashion, asserted that the
Tribal Nations engage in agreements with state governments to operate gaming
enterprises or violate federal law. This delegation of federal treaty-making authority to
the political subdivisions of state governments has signaled a severe intrusion into the
Tribal Nations' relationship with the United States. 
126
The current posture of this state compacting requirement for Tribal Nations 127 has
resulted in litigation upholding state sovereign immunity from suit where Tribal Nations
have activated the IGRA to enforce the state's good faith responsibility to negotiate,
128
as well as putting Tribal Nations in jeopardy of severe monetary fires and criminal
charges for operating gaming enterprises without state agreements. 129 Rather than risk
costly litigation defending the Tribal Nation's right to operate its own business on tribal
lands, for the most part, Tribes have entered into state compacting agreements.
The state governments, free from any type of legal consequences for refusing to
negotiate with the Tribes, have been in a position to extract fees on a net percentage basis
for the approval of gaming compacts. This type of extortion 13° has the sanction of
federal law through the IGRA. Thus, the IGRA has authorized a type of state taxation on
the tribal gaming enterprises by forcing the Tribes to enter into compacts with states.
In addition, the IGRA authorizes federal taxation on any disbursement from a
Tribal Nation's gaming proceeds to a tribal member. 13 1 The U.S. Congress has also
authorized state taxation for the purposes of unemployment benefits for those employed
by the Tribe itself, each tribal subdivision, tribal subsidiary, or any wholly owned tribal
business enterprise, including gaming enterprises.132 Thus, under the IGRA, federal and
state taxation have gained a new foothold in tribal economic enterprises. This is the
125. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
126. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1990)
(challenging the IGRA on four grounds: The act violated tribal self-determination guaranteed in the treaties
with the U.S. government; "Congress violated its federal trust responsibility" in passing the act; the act
unconstitutionally restricts federal courts from their constitutional function of resolving cases or controversies;
and the act interfered with tribal "self-government in violation of the Fifth Amendment").
127. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
128. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
129. See generally Rubin Ranat, Student Author, Tribal-State Compacts: Legitimate or Illegal Taxation of
Indian Gaming in California? 26 Whittier L. Rev. 953 (2005).
130. Extortion is defined as "[t]he obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." Black's Law Dictionary at 405.
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(D).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 3309(d). 19
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most contemporary expression of the colonizing philosophy as the entrance of Tribal
Nations into the gaming industry has occurred only over the last few decades.
E. Transaction Taxation Based on Indian/Non-Indian Status
Because of the exhaustible nature of the resources available to the Tribal Nations
from mining, timber, and other land intensive industry, the Tribal Nations have sought
other types of retail activities to sustain tribal economies. Many Tribal Nations were
able to generate revenue through convenience stores and the licensing of trading posts or
smoke shops. These activities have been conducted within Indian Country. Beginning
in the 1970s, state attempts to impose taxation on cigarette sales within Indian country
would prove to be a litigious issue for the Tribal Nations.
1. State Imposition of Cigarette Sales Taxes in Indian Country: Based on Race
of Purchaser
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 133 the state of Montana attempted to impose several taxes on retail income
for the Tribes: A license fee on retail on-reservation vendors, a sales tax on cigarette
sales by Indians to Indians on the reservation, and a sales tax on cigarette sales to non-
Indians on the reservation. 134 The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue whether
the Tribal Nations were barred from bringing an injunctive action in federal court against
the state imposition of taxes on reservation lands. 135 The Court found that 28 U.S.C. §
1362 was intended by Congress to give Tribes access to federal courts in suits that may
have been brought on their behalf by the United States as trustee, but had not been
brought for whatever reason.136 Therefore, the Tribes' injunctive action was properly
before the Court.
The state also advanced the argument that, by virtue of the tax-exempt status of
reservation Indians, the federal government had forced upon Montana a racially-based
exemption that was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. 137 The Court rearticulated the long-
settled principle that Indian Tribes are specially treated populations based on the
historical relationship with the federal government.
138
The Court then summarily rendered the state taxes on cigarette sales to Indians and
the vendors' licensing as void and contrary to federal law. 139  However, the Court
upheld the state tax on cigarette sales to non-Indians in Indian Country. 140 The sales tax
was viewed by the Court as a "minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood that in
133. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
134. Id. at 467-68. The state also imposed a property tax on motor vehicles belonging to tribal members on
the reservation. Id. at 468-69. This part of the case will be included in the separate examination of "Taxation
of Tribal Member Property and Income."
135. Id. at470-75.
136. Id. at472-73.
137. Moe, 425 U.S. at 479.
138. Id. at 479-80 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-55 (1974)).
139. Id. at 480-81.
140. Id. at 483.
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its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a
concededly lawful tax."
14 1
With the finding that non-Indian purchasers of goods on reservations are subject to
state sales tax, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately undermined the Tribal Nations' efforts
at revenue generating enterprises located on tribal lands. This line of cigarette taxation
cases also illustrates the U.S. Supreme Court's imposition of racial discrimination in the
area of taxation within tribal jurisdictions. Tribes are put in the unwelcome position of
asserting taxes on a race-based analysis-who is Indian and who is not-in order to
determine which tax may apply.
By legalizing state taxes on retail sales to non-Indians within Indian country, the
Court has effectively claimed full dominion over tribal lands and economic activity in
the vein of colonization. Tribal territorial sovereignty is subsumed by this decision in
which the race of the purchaser within the tribal community determines whether state
taxation is applicable. Furthermore, as in the previous sanctioning of state taxation on
tribal resources, the economic viability of tribal transactions is diminished with the
imposition of state taxation on top of the inherent authority of Tribal Nations to impose
tribal taxation within tribal lands.
The next case in this series is Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation.142 The state of Washington imposed a cigarette sales tax by
requiring cigarette wholesalers to affix stamps on cigarettes intended for non-Indian
purchasers on reservation lands. 143 The state had seized unstamped cigarettes destined
for the reservation as contraband based upon its view that the cigarettes were to be sold
to non-Indian purchasers. 144  The Court characterized the tax-exempt status of goods
sold on the reservation by tribal businesses or subject to tribal taxes 145 alone as an unfair
trade mechanism. 
14 6
If [the Tribe's] assertion were accepted, the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open
chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep
discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We do not believe that principles
of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or
otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to
persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.
147
141. Id.
142. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
143. Id. at 141-42. The state also imposed a personal property tax on Indians living on the reservation. Id.
at 142. This part of the case will be included in the separate examination of "Taxation of Tribal Member
Property and Income."
144. Id.
145. See Gould, supra n. 67, at 895-96.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation upheld the inherent right of
tribes to tax non-Indians for reservation sales, and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe upheld the
power of a tribe to impose severance taxes on non-Indian leases. But even these few victories were
not untrammeled. Non-Indians could challenge the civil jurisdiction of tribes in federal
proceedings, and states could disrupt tribal economies by taxing transactions on reservation which
involved non-Indians.
Id. (footnote omitted).
146. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
147. Id. 21
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Claiming that the Tribes were trying to take an unfair advantage of their status as
sovereigns, the Court failed to acknowledge that the Tribes have the inherent authority to
regulate the sale of goods on tribal lands with consequent tribal taxation regardless of the
race or nationality of the purchaser. The Court returned to the language of the oil and
gas leasing cases to pronounce "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state and tribal
schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without ousting the other."' 148
What the Court failed to mention was that this kind of super-taxation would oust
prospective businesses from the reservation.
In Colville, the revenue generated by the Tribal Nations on reservation land
through the sale of goods received the same fate as the oil and gas production, in that the
revenue was subject to double taxation, tribal and state, on the very same product.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe,149 the
State argued that the Tribe resided on trust land, which should receive different treatment
than reservation land in regards to state taxing of cigarette sales. 150 The Court held that
the state was entitled to the sales tax for non-Indian purchases of cigarettes within Indian
Country, but was not entitled to sales tax on Indian purchases. 15 1
Another contention brought by the State was that it be permitted to seek a direct
judgment in federal court against the Tribe for remittance of past sales tax collection
regardless of tribal sovereign immunity. 152 The Court refused to reconsider the well-
established principle of tribal sovereign immunity in the case and offered the State
several alternatives in collecting the taxes: 1) bring suit against tribal officials, 2) seizure
of unstamped cigarettes off-reservation, or 3) enter into an agreement with the Tribe for
collection of taxes. 1
53
The final statement on the collection of state taxes on cigarettes for non-Indian
purchasers within Indian Country was provided in Department of Taxation and Finance
of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. 154 There the U.S. Supreme Court considered
the New York regulations that had been imposed upon retailers in Indian Country for the
sales of cigarettes. 155 The state regulatory scheme required first a "probable demand"
figure for sales on reservation to Indians and limited the number of tax-exempt cigarette
sales to that number. 156  The scheme required cigarette vendors on reservations to
document tribal member status by show of tribal member identification for each sale of
cigarettes and to give monthly reports to the state tax commission. 157  Finally, the
scheme imposed no restrictions on the sales of state taxed cigarettes. 158
The Court relied on its prior decisions in Moe, Colville, and Potawatomi in finding
148. Id. at 158.
149. 489 U.S. 505 (1991).
150. Id. at 511.
151. Id. at 512 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. 134; see also Moe, 425 U.S. 463).
152. Id. at 514.
153. Id. (citing Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); City Vending of Muskogee,
Inc. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1990)).
154. 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
155. Id. at64.
156. Id. at 65-66.
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that "[s]tates have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes that might
easily be evaded through purchases of tax-exempt cigarettes on reservations; that interest
outweighs tribes' modest interest in offering a tax exemption to customers who would
ordinarily shop elsewhere." 159  With the Milhelm Attea decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the treatment of tribal members as second-class citizens within their own
lands by requiring documentation at every sale of cigarettes to a tribal member.
160
2. Motor Fuels Excise Tax in Indian Country
In a 1995 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Oklahoma imposition
of a motor-fuels tax on the Chickasaw Nation's convenience store. In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,16 1 the Court set out a standard categorical approach
when the state seeks to tax the Tribe or tribal members within Indian Country. 162 The
rule that the Court articulated was that "[i]f the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a
tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be
enforced absent clear congressional authorization." 163 The Court easily concluded that
the legal incidence of the motor-fuels tax fell on the Tribal Nation and thus, voided the
state tax.164 The Court found its extensive balancing tests as set out in Bracker165 would
apply for a tax where the legal incidence fell on non-Indians. 166 However, the Court did
instruct Oklahoma that by rewriting its taxing statute so as to place the legal incident on
someone other than the tribal retailer, the result may be different.
167
Apparently, the state of Kansas heeded the U.S. Supreme Court's advice when the
state sought to tax the non-Indian distributor of motor fuels to the Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation's casino gas station. In Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation,16 8 the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished the Chickasaw decision at the outset,
finding that "Kansas law makes clear that it is the distributor, rather than the retailer, that
159. MelhelmAttea, 512 U.S. at 73.
160. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court
in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1629-30 (1996).
The Court invoked no principle for its extension of state jurisdiction over reservation Indians in
Milhelm. It simply stated that the "balance of state, federal, and tribal interests' in this area thus
leaves more room for state regulation than in others." The decision effectively sanctioned state
regulation of commerce with Indian tribes, a matter historically and constitutionally reserved to
Congress.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
161. 515 U.S. 450 (1995). The state also imposed an income tax on tribal members. Id. at 453. This part of
the case will be included in a separate examination of "Taxation of Tribal Member Income within Indian
Country."
162. Id. at 458-59.
163. Id. at459.
164. Id. at 461-62; see Getches, supra n. 160, at 1630. Getches notes that "[iun Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Chickasaw Nation, the Court characterized its approach to state regulation of Indian activities in Indian
country as 'balancing interests.' Never before had the Court allowed consideration of state interests-and
certainly not a balancing of interests-in a case involving Indian activity on the reservation." Id.
165. 448 U.S. at 142-45.
166. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 459.
167. Id. at461.
168. 546 U.S. 95 (2005). 23
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is liable to pay the motor fuel tax." 169 The Court also disregarded its earlier statement as
to the applicability of the Bracker test by reasoning that the tax attaches off-reservation
on the non-Indian distributor rather than on-reservation triggering the balancing test. 170
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation argued that the taxable event occurred when the
distributor reported fuel sales and then remitted payment based upon those sales, which
would have occurred on-reservation in this instance. 171  The Court rejected this
argument, narrowly reading Kansas law as imposing its tax upon the initial receipt of the
fuel no matter what the ultimate destination of the fuel, thereby foreclosing a balancing
of interests under Bracker. 
172
In addition, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation argued that the Kansas motor-fuel
tax encumbers the tribal motor-fuel tax. 173 The U.S. Supreme Court in response
minimized the governmental interest of the Nation in collecting taxes and stated that the
profit from the tribal gas station returns to the Nation as owner of the station.174 The
Court went on to imply that the Nation was overreaching by opposing the state tax
impacting the motor fuel sales on-reservation-"[t]he Nation merely seeks to increase
those revenues by purchasing untaxed fuel."'1 75
Finally, the Nation asserted that the state tax was discriminatory because fuel sold
or delivered to other sovereigns was exempted. 176 In response, the Court held that the
Nation "is not similarly situated to the sovereigns exempted" based on the maintenance
of roads and bridges by the state. 177 The Court failed to mention that most Tribal
Nations would gladly allow states to retrocede former tribal territory to the Nations, so
this argument is more about state insistence upon jurisdiction than on maintenance
provided. The dissent in the case revealed that the record indicates a different reality,
that Kansas fails to provide maintenance "even on their own roads running through the
reservation." 1
78
Through these cases, the Court has sent a strong message to states that if the statute
is worded a certain way in terms of legal incidence, then state taxation will be allowed on
motor fuel en route to tribal territory.
3. Hotel Occupancy Tax in Indian Country: Race of Land Owner
On March 29, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court added another chapter to the non-
Indian taxation drain on reservations. In Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley,17 9 the
Court held that the Navajo Nation could not impose a hotel occupancy tax on a licensed
169. Id. at 103.
170. Id. at 105, 112.
171. Id. at 108.
172. Id. at 108-09.
173. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 114.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 115.
177. Id.
178. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 129 (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
179. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
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trading post operating within the reservation boundaries on fee land.180 The Court, led
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, based this holding on the premise that "[a]n Indian tribe's
sovereign power to tax-whatever its derivation-reaches no further than tribal land."
18 1
Thus, distinguishing the legal boundaries of the Navajo Reservation from establishing
the Tribe's taxing jurisdiction, as is the case for states and counties, 182 from the actual
parcels of tribal lands held by the Tribe or tribal members as composing the tax base.
The Court, reinterpreting previous decisions in the area, stated that the Tribes
could not be described as sovereigns in the sense of exerting full jurisdiction over all
citizens within reservation boundaries. 183 In a footnote, the Court found relevant that the
General Allotment Act equated land alienation with "the dissolution of tribal affairs and
jurisdiction," thus indicating the congressional intent that non-Indians purchasing the
tribal lands from the United States would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction. 184 Relying
on the judicially constructed Montana test, the Court found that the hotel occupancy tax
was neither related to a consensual relationship with the Navajo Nation, nor was it
"necessary to vindicate the Navajo Nation's political integrity" and therefore, civil
jurisdiction over the non-Indian hotel occupiers was struck as an invalid extension of
tribal authority. 
185
Whereas all nations in the global community are recognized as having jurisdiction
including taxation jurisdiction within their legal boundaries, the U.S. Supreme Court has,
through its judicial opinions invented a limitation for Tribal Nations based on the race of
the citizen entering the reservation boundaries and buying land within those boundaries.
This decision furthers the philosophy of colonization by denying to Tribal Nations full
legal and regulatory authority within their territorial boundaries, forcing the Nations to
accept regulation and concomitant taxing authority by the individual U.S. states reaching
into the tribal territory.
F. Taxation of Tribal Member Property and Income within Indian Country
In the U.S. Constitution, the rights of individuals are clearly spelled out and the
basis of government is said to derive from individuals acting collectively as evidenced in
the preamble "We, the People." 186 The Constitution expressly includes language that
Indians are not taxed. 187 This appears to be an individual right, although the Tribal
180. Id. at 659.
181. Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
182. If legal jurisdiction was premised on how the land was acquired to the present ownership, every private
landowner would trace their title back to the U.S. government and then to the Tribal Nations who entered
treaties with the United States. Therefore, the same argument applied to states-their taxing jurisdiction
extending only as far as the actual land owned by the states-would fail to leave any land except the seat of
state government and state parks within the state's taxing jurisdiction. Privately-owned fee land does not
compose "state land" yet the states assert taxing jurisdiction based on the legal boundaries they have drawn.
For Tribes, the legal boundaries are drawn around their respective reservations or Indian communities and
tribal taxing jurisdiction should fall within those boundaries regardless of the ownership of the land.
183. Id. at650-51.
184. Id. at 650 n. I (citing Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 559 n. 9 (1981)).
185. Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. at 659.
186. U.S. Const. preamble.
187. Id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 25
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Nations view themselves as a collective in the names they recognize for themselves as
generally translating to simply "the People." From this collective perspective, the
individual tax status of tribal members has been an area that the Tribal Nations have
sought to protect from federal and state intrusion as well.
In 1973, a Navajo tribal member who derived all of her income from on-
reservation sources challenged Arizona's imposition of a state income tax in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.188 The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed
the landscape of federal Indian law and regarded the federal treaties and statutes as a
relevant "backdrop" in deciding the issue before it. 189 The Treaty between th6 Navajo
Nation and the U.S. government in 1868 was cited for the proposition that the Navajo
intended to reserve a sovereign domain and exclude non-Indian interference from their
lands. 190 The Treaty read with both the Arizona Enabling Act, which exempts tribal
lands from state jurisdiction, and the federal policy on Indian tax-exempt status were
grounds for the Court's holding that state taxation was void for tribal member income
derived from on-reservation sources. 19 1
This result did not end the state attempts to reach tribal member income through
taxation. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,192 the state argued that
state income taxes were valid against tribal members regardless of their residence within
Indian Country. 193 In fact, the state asserted that tribal member income was subject to
194both state and tribal taxation (as well as federal). The U.S. Supreme Court took a
narrow view of the McClanahan decision and held that "[t]o determine whether a tribal
member is exempt from state income taxes under McClanahan, a court first must
determine the residence of that tribal member." 195  The Court also spoke to the
Oklahoma Tax Commission as a prior litigant and reiterated the point that Indian
Country was not solely reservation lands and that the Court would not distinguish the
Tribal Nations on such a distinction. 196
Two years later in Chickasaw Nation, 19 7 the state of Oklahoma imposed its income
tax on tribal members employed by the Chickasaw Nation, but living on lands outside of
Indian Country. 198 The Chickasaw Nation based its claim of tax exemption for all tribal
members on the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, which contained explicit language on
freedom from external governmental control for the Chickasaw and their descendants. 199
The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to secure to the said
[Chickasaw] Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and
188. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
189. Id. at 172.
190. Id. at 174-75.
191. Id. at 181.
192. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
193. Id. at 119.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 124.
196. Id. at 124-25.
197. 515 U.S. 450.
198. Id. at 462-63.
199. Id. at 465.
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property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a
right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their
descendants ... but the U.S. shall forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and
against, all [such] laws ....
The Court stated that the treaty language only applied to the limits of the land that was
controlled by the Chickasaw Nation.2° 1 Furthermore, the Court characterized the Tribe's
position as "conferring super-sovereign authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's
sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those who choose to live within that
jurisdiction's limits.' '20 2 Therefore, the Court held that the state could assess income
taxes against tribal members employed by the Tribe, but housed outside of trust lands,
and noted in a footnote that federal income taxation was applicable to tribal members as
well. 2
0 3
The Court failed to properly consider the historical context within which the
Chickasaw Nation case arose. The land base of the Tribal Nations located in Oklahoma
was virtually stolen from underneath them in the greedy rush for oil. The ability for
tribal members to live on the limited parcels of tribal land left within Oklahoma was an
unrealistic standard to hold them to when they had already evidenced their continued
identity as part of the Chickasaw Nation by seeking employment from their tribal
government. Through this opinion, the Court further narrowed the tax base from which
the Tribal Nations can collect revenue without unduly burdening tribal citizens who must
also pay federal and state taxes.
204
In the area of tribal personal property, there are few items to which tax may attach
within Indian Country due to the generational poverty experienced by the majority of
tribal members as a result of the colonization of tribal lands, resources, and legal
authority. However, the states have intruded into the tribal lands and attempted to
impose taxes on motor vehicles as a way of reaching tribal property. This discussion
begins with the revisitation of the Moe205decision, where the state of Montana imposed a
property tax on vehicles owned by tribal members living on the reservation as part of
state registration procedures.20 6  The Court relied heavily on its decisions in
McClanahan and Mescalero to conclude that federal law demanded that the state be
barred from imposing its taxes on Indians living on reservation lands.207 In Moe, the
Court's opinion dealt with the denial of the state property tax in a cursory manner.
In Colville,2 °8 the state asserted excise taxes against tribal members' automobiles,
200. Id. (quoting from the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, art. IV. (Sept. 27, 1830), 7 Stat. 333-334)
(internal quotations omitted).
201. Id. at465-66.
202. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 466.
203. Id. at466n. 16.
204. Tribal member income is subject to federal income taxation even for elected tribal officials. See e.g.
Jourdain v. Commr., 617 F.2d 507, 509 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980) (holding that Tribal
Chairman was subject to federal income taxation).
205. 425 U.S. 463.
206. Id. at 468-69.
207. Id. at 480-81.
208. 447 U.S. 134. 27
EagleWoman: The Philosophy of Colonization Underlying Taxation Imposed Upon T
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
TULSA LA W REVIEW
mobile homes, travel trailers, and campers both on and off the reservation.20 9 The Court
relied on its holding in Moe to find that the Washington taxes at issue were not different
in character, but only in name. 2 1 The issue of state taxation of on-reservation property
could not be so easily circumvented according to the Court.2 1 1
After Montana and Washington both unsuccessfully tried to impose property taxes
on tribal members' vehicles, Oklahoma attempted to do the same. In Sac and Fox
Nation,2 12 the Court soundly rejected the state's excise taxes and registration fees on
tribal members' vehicles within Indian country.2 13
Oklahoma taxes are no different than those in Moe and Colville. Like the taxes in both
those cases, the excise tax and registration fee are imposed in addition to a sales tax; the
two taxes are imposed for use both on and off Indian country; and the registration fees are
assessed annually based on a percentage of the value of the vehicle. Oklahoma may not
avoid our precedent by avoiding the name "personal property tax" here any more than
Washington could in Colville.2
14
The Court did instruct the state that had it changed more than "nomenclature" in
assessing its motor vehicle tax, the result may have been different. 215
In terms of tribal members residing within tribal territory and employed by tribal
entities, the Court has recognized that, tribal sovereignty preempts state income taxation.
Likewise, tribal member property within the tribal territory may not be reached by state
regulation and taxation, such as motor vehicle registration fees. While the winnowing
away of the legal jurisdiction of Tribal Nations has been the trend since the formation of
the United States, the inherent sovereignty of tribal governments over tribal members
within Indian country remains in the face of state attempts to intrude in this domain.
IV. CONCLUSION: COLONIZATION OF TRIBAL NATIONS MUST BE REPLACED WITH
RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY TO ENABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The United States government arose from a dispute over taxation and the
legitimacy of Great Britain asserting heavy tribute from the colonies. This historical
context is ironic in terms of the current assertion of taxation by the Euro-Americans over
Tribal Nations. As the colonies waged war for their independence from Great Britain,
they embarked on a course of colonization of mid-North America by illegally taking
tribal lands and subjecting tribal peoples to inferior legal status. In the realm of taxation,
the colonization process continues towards tribal peoples as the U.S. Supreme Court
sanctions the continued depleting of tribal resources on behalf of state and federal
government.
The United States has attempted to claim for itself tribal resources, lands, and
labor. Through the allotment policy, the United States intentionally destroyed tribal
209. Id. at 162.
210. Id. at 163.
211. Id.
212. 508 U.S. 114.
213. Id. at 128.
214. Id. at 127-28.
215. Id. at 128 (citing to Colville, 447 U.S. at 163-64).
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economies, leaving tribal peoples in a state of generational poverty. In the decades that
followed as tribal peoples have adapted to the surrounding capitalist economy, incursions
by the United States and its separate states into the legal jurisdiction of Tribal Nations
has impeded the rebuilding of tribal economies and the restoration of prosperity for tribal
peoples. The lands, timber, minerals, waters, air space, species, and human resources
that the United States has generally coerced from Tribal Nations or outright stolen
provide the foundation for the United States to maintain its status as a super power in the
global community to date. To impose federal and state taxes after stripping Tribal
Nations of the majority of their material possessions and wealth resources adds insult to
injury.
Another problem in the area of federal taxation stems from a lack of understanding
by the European descendants regarding the Tribal Nations' perspectives on the purpose
and process of government wealth. For Tribal Nations, when the people have very little
beyond the essentials for life, demanding payment from them is contrary to tribal
beliefs.216 By seeking to impose state and federal taxation on every possible transaction
within tribal territory, the U.S. mentality of colonization of tribal jurisdictions can be
likened to a feudal lord demanding tribute. This demand for tribute by the Tribal
Nations is completely contrary to the history of North America, tribal sovereignty, and
the basic goal of tribal government self-sufficiency and can only be viewed as an
extension of colonization over tribal peoples.
Since the Euro-Americans first entered this continent, the Tribal Nations have
attempted to coexist peacefully within their own jurisdictions based on the treaties
entered into with the United States. However, the United States has failed to honor the
agreements reached with the Tribes. Tribal leadership has expressed the intent to work
with the U.S. government and to attain peaceful communities side by side. The stance of
the United States continues to be one of military threat and legal trickery to deprive
Tribal Nations of a worthwhile quality of life, expression of tribal governmental
authority, and respectful coexistence.
As Tatanka Iyotanka (Sitting Bull) stated during the Powder River Council in
1877, the injustices and unreasonableness of the Euro-Americans in their treatment
towards Tribal Nations places the Tribes in the position of constant defense in terms of
tribal resources and sovereignty.
Yet, hear me, friends! [W]e have now to deal with another people, small and feeble when
our forefathers first met them but now great and overbearing. Strangely enough, they have
a mind to till the soil and the love of possessions is a disease with them. These people have
made many rules that the rich may break, but the poor may not! ... They even take tithes
of the poor and weak to support the rich and those who rule. They claim this mother of
ours, the Earth, for their own use, and fence their neighbors away from her; and deface her
with their buildings and their refuse....
216. See Kent Nerbum, The Wisdom of the Native Americans 63 (New World Lib. 1999).
I am also told, but this I hardly believe, that their Great Chief compels every man to pay him for the
land he lives upon and all his personal goods-even those he needs for his own existence-every
year. I am sure that we could not live under such a law.
Id. (as stated by Charles Alexander Eastman's uncle, Santee Sioux).
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This nation is like a spring freshet: it overruns its banks and destroys all who are in its path.
We cannot dwell side by side. Only seven years ago we made a treaty by which we were
assured that the buffalo country should be left to us forever. Now they threaten to take that
from us also. My brothers, shall we submit? Or shall we say to them: First kill me, before
you can take possession of my fatherland!
2 17
Since the 1700s, Tribal Nations have made enormous efforts to negotiate and live in
peace with the Euro-Americans. It is time for the United States through its legislature
and judiciary to honor the status and sovereignty of Tribal Nations.
The injustices perpetrated against Tribal Nations during the early 1900s through
the 2000s by the federal government while purporting to exercise a fiduciary duty to the
Tribes must be answered and remedied. Without the legal quagmire now asserted in the
taxation realm to form three levels of taxation on reservations and race-based distinctions
on tribal transactions, the Tribal Nations would be in a position to rebuild economically
and independently their communities and provide for the health and welfare of tribal
members.
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